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The Significabce  of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies: A Model and 
I 
I 
Statistical Estimation 
Department of Politics, New York University 
In the long h story of legislative roll call analyses, there continues to exist a 
particularly  tro  bling  problem:  There is no satisfactory method for measuring 
the relative im  ortance or significance of individual roll calls. A measure of roll 
call significance  1  would be intersting in and of itself, but many have realized that 
it could also su  stantially improve empirical research. The consequence of this 
situation is that  undreds of researchers risk heteroskedastic disturbances (resulting 
in inefficient es 1  imates and biased  standard errors and test statistics), are unable 
to appropriate1  choose the  roll calls most suited to their theory  (resulting in 
analyses that  ay not correctly  test their theory), and often use methods that 
create  more pr  blems  than  they  solve  (resulting  in  selection  bias,  unrealistic 
weighting sche  es, or relatively subjective measures). This article introduces a 
new method de i  igned to meet these problems. Based on an application of Box- 
Tiao interventi  analysis, the method extracts from observed voting participation 
scores the "rev t  aled preferences"  of legislators as a measure of roll call sidcance. 
Applying this dethod to roll calls from the U.S. Senate demonstrates the success 
of the method  /and  suggests its utility  in applied  research.  @ 1986 Academic Press, 
Inc. 
In the numerou  recent studies of voting behavior in legislatures, the question of 
deciding upon t d  e relative significance of roll calls remains a persistent and unsolved 
methodological problem. (Riker,  1959: 377) 
Since 1959, cQmmon research practices and widely used conventions 
have flourished, but obvious and unmeasured variations in the significance 
of  legislative roil calls continue to be a nagging concern.' More than a 
Send requests forreprints to Gary King, Department of  Politics, New York University, 
25 Waverly Place,  ew York, NY  10003. An earlier version of this article was presented 
at the annual Politic  1 Science Methodology Society conference, Berkeley, California, 25- 
28 July  1985. I ap reciate  the helpful  comments from  the participants  at that  meeting, 
particularly those o !  Christopher Achen and Nathaniel Beck. Thanks also to my colleagues 
at New York Univetsity, especially Steven Brams and Paul Zarowin. I also appreciate the 
comm'ents from ~ithhell  Duneier, George Edwards, Arthur Goldberger, Barbara Hinckley, 
Charles Pearson, thb editors, and the anonymous referees. 
1  ' Although I devellop a statistical model, my use of the term "significance"  is not meant 
to refer to "statistictd  significance"  or to have any statistical connotations. For a definition 
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later, researchers continue to note that, "there  is 
etermine the most important vote"  (Edwards, 1985: 
e unusual quality and extent of the data--on  the floor 
of the U.S. Congress, in some state legislatures, and 
s around the world-it  is also an important  meth- 
r social science research. 
nificance of roll calls could substantially improve 
example, Matthews and Stimson (1975) argued 
simulation "model  applied only to a subset, the 
ions"  (see also Chenyholmes and Shapiro, 1969). 
s the non-routine, often controversial, rancorous 
mary interest"  (see also Kingdon, 1981). Most 
best to particular types of roll calls--either  the 
t routine, or the most representative. However, 
ed method of estimating the significance of roll 
holars  routinely  use  all  roll calls for selected 
eir analyses. The consequence of not discriminating 
1 calls can be  serious.  For  example, since there is 
e (error) in  predictions  for roll  calls that are 
opriate  than  for  those  that  are appropriate,  these 
are surely  heteroskedastic (i.e., have nonconstant 
ient estimates and biased standard errors 
nce of roll calls were known and utilized, 
be avoided. Furthermore, this additional information 
existing substantive theory. Interaction terms 
ns could be used to model those independent variables 
be most powerful among less significant roll calls and 
1 among more significant roll calls. Variations 
ss groups (party, regional, and  ideological 
an added dimension to legislative analysis. 
nd justified method of assigning significance 
is by William  H. Riker (1959). Professor 
1 call significance score by  combining the 
with  the  number of  representatives who 
ught was that margin would measure "the 
ntest [a roll call] outcome"  (1959: 379). 
of  "roll  call  significbnce..?  I have adopted Riker's  (1959:  378)  "distinction  between  the 
sign$cance  of a roll  all, a judgment made at the time a roll call occurs, and the importance 
of a roll call, a judg  ent made at some time after it occurs."  Riker argues that the judgment 
of roll call importan e "both  of  the individual  scholar and of any conceivable  panel  of 
outside experts is su pect. The only remaining persons available to evaluate the significance 
of  roll  calls  are the  members  of  the  legislature themselves."  Thus, instead  of  using  a 
complex series of c  ding rules  to ascertain a priori importance,  concentration  is on the 
behavior  of  legislat  rs to estimate  realized  importance, what  is  called  here  "roll  call 
significance."  1  i I  ESTIMATING ROLL CALL SIGNIFICANCE  137 
as a measure of effort; the more significant 
ipants there would be. By  assigning values 
els of participation and columns indicating 
n) he derives a unique score for each combination of 
ot of credit for being the first and still the most 
treatment of the topic. However, three relevant 
First, Yohe (1968) does not propose to change 
ument, but he does note several biases in, and 
corrections to, Riker's  method. 
umes that a narrow margin is the mark of an 
this may  sometimes be true, I would argue 
onsider five arguments: (a) A roll call with a 
not necessarily one which is significant. Imagine, for 
has neither meaning nor significance for any 
case,  it  is  likely  that  votes  would  be  cast 
erage, in a 50-50%  tie and the narrowest of 
f very low significance, complete cue taking 
is likely to resylt in  the margin reflecting the party division in the leg- 
ry narrow margin. On much more significant roll calls, 
turn  out  to  be  small  or  large  depending  upon  the 
ferences. Thus, margin  seems not to be a very good 
11  call significance. (b) Although heightened controversy 
elated to importance-since  controversy implies that 
ant to at  least  some legislators-a  close margin is 
ntroversy.  In the  case of  an insignificant roll  call 
, the  issue  should  also  be  noncontroversial.  It 
margin would also make a poor indirect measure 
other possibility for using margin is as an indirect 
e through visibility. It could be argued that since 
elected officials value publicity, a visible roll call would be a significant 
one. The proble  here is that a close margin does not appear to guarantee 
visibility. A un 1  nimous censure of a colleague, for example, is likely to 
have very  high visibility.  Thus, the  margin of  victory  is  quite a poor 
direct  and  indifect  measure of roll  call  significance. (d)  Furthermore, 
margin and participation are empirically unrelated.  For example, in the 
200 roll calls anqyzed below, the bivariate correlation between participation 
and margin is pnly  0.015.  This  makes the  idea that  the two variables 
represent one lfnderlying dimension dubious at best. (e) Finally, since 
most legislative bodies are characterized by full information and strategic 
voting, the dic  otomous outcome of  the roll call (win/lose)  is   rob ably 
of more import  ",  nce than the margin. Votes over and above the margin 
many times reqect short-run constituency and other ~ressures.~ 
I 
Some  studies  dmit roll calls on the  basis of the  margin of victory (see Footnote 3). 138  !  GARY KING 
method seeks to "determine"  rather than "estimate" 
This is a crucial distinction; for only with statistical 
formal models can we make reliable probabilistic 
based conclusions. The statistical model which 
on Riker's useful model but concentrates more 
on estimation 
remainder of  this paper (1) builds a model 
the appropriate methods of  measuring 
of  this model, and (3) estimates 
of  roll calls from the United 
States Senate. 
(A  MODEL OF ROLL CALL SIGNIFICANCE 
By dropping margin (of victory or defeat) from Riker's (1959) measure, 
only the numb  r of  members participating in  a roll call remains. This is 
a plausible me  sure of  significance, consistent with Riker's, which allows 
the legislators' behavior to define the significance of  roll calls (for an 
application, se  King, 1986a). If a roll call is more important, it is assumed  i  that  more  will  participate.  If  it  is  less  significant,  then  the  constant 
pressures of  c  nstituents and others will reduce participation. Since roll 
call significanc  is unobservable, or is at least very difficult to measure 
(see Footnote  ),  we  extract an indicator from a phenomenon which is 
easier to observ  the participatory behavior of the legislators. Significance, 
then, is evaluat  d by the members of the legislature, and it is a measure  I  of how important the legislators  themselves see each roll  call. 
I 
These procedures dre not  only irrelevant to their stated  purpose,  but  they can result  in 
variable which may cause problems  in this case is the degree of 
limited  procedures have  been  applied  to or proposed  for the 
decisions (see Ma  and Stimpson,  1975). (4) Still others eliminate all unanimous or 
of this relatively subj ctive measure. (6)  Some personally select a small number of signifcant 
roll calls based on in erviews or a close reading of the congressional process; this amounts 
to  replicating the  C  ngressional  Quarterly  method, but  perhaps  with  different  or more 
systematic  selection  rules (see Kingdon,  1981). (7) A final  "method"  is to drop all roll 
calls which  do not  fi  1  a Guttman or other issue or ideological scale. A moment's r 
with raw partici 
is a function of 
Examples of thc 
(as participation 
Wednesday, an( 
electronic votin 
Second, if  a 
Washington  to 
since legislators 
ticipation  rates 
remain artificial 
issues are consi 
would overestin 
important ones. 
We need, the 
significance of  1 
same time, we 
participation. T 
Tiao (1975) "in 
The Roll Call S 
n,  = 
where 
n,  = 
In a sense, tl 
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flection, however, indicates at least two major problems 
lation as a measure of significance. First, participation 
)ther factors that are unrelated to roll call significance. 
ie  are procedural variables such as the day of the week 
In  Monday and Friday is probably lower than on Tuesday, 
Thursday), proximity to election day, the institution of 
, vacant seats, and illnesses. 
ighly  significant roll call occurs, and members rush to 
ast their  votes,  participation  will  increase.  However, 
have an electoral incentive to keep their personal par- 
is  high  as possible,  roll  call  participation  is  likely to 
I  high for several more votes even if  only insignificant 
lered (Riker, 1959: 380). Thus, raw participation  levels 
ite the significance of unimportant votes which succeed 
efore, a method of controlling for the influence of the 
.evious roll calls on current participation levels. At the 
eed to control for the effect of procedural variables on 
ese requirements can be  met by  a form of  a Box and 
:rvention model." 
:niJicance Model 
a + X,P  + 8(B)s, 
the number of legislators voting on roll call t (t =  1, 
-9 TI, 
an intercept term 
a parameter vector representing the influence of X,. 
a vector of  observed procedural variables that 
influence the number of  legislators participating in roll 
call t. 
(1 - BIB - &B* -  . . - 8gBq), a qth-order 
polynomial in the back shift operator B where 
for k  =  1, . . . ,  q, 
parameters representing the influence of previous 
values of  s (st-, , . . . , s,-,)  on the current value of 
n,, (these are hypothesized to be negative), 
the number of  roll calls for which a shock to s, 
continues to be felt, 
n, - a - X&? + (8,s,-,  +  + ...  + Oqs,-,), 
roll call significance, unobserved due to a,  P, and el, 
. . ., 8,  (the last term in parentheses is calculated by 
multiplying s, by the right-hand side of  8(B)). 
:  last line in  this model, with s, on the left-hand  side, 140  1  GARY  KING 
terest; thus, the first line is the directly estimable 
n. In either case, st can be considered a vector of 
rs measuring  the  significance of  each roll  call to 
ting body under study. It is equal to participation 
ts of the procedural variables (X,)  and of previous 
ficance (st-,  ,  s,-*,  . . . , 
represents these 
ortant roll call to be brought to the floor for 
me to Washington, DC to participate  in this 
significant roll call. The shock propagates for only a 
a, convenience, and electoral incentive keep 
,  even if  these succeeding roll calls are not 
ssigns q  (the order of  the  moving average 
roll  calls  for  which  participation  remains 
ng to the data used in estimating this model 
and q, a discussion of  three unresolved 
parate roll call significance from random 
rrect assumption that there is no error. 
scholarly literature and the congressional 
nlikely to cause a problem.  In one, s, 
rror-a  series of random shocks with 
1 estimation will produce an unbiased 
be  distributed  randomly  and  would 
er, is that physical time 
ime, and the latter can 
antly, alternative spec- 
e tried, but they added 
s may abstain in order 
uments help to refute 
The only reason  ble  way  to explain such behavior is to say that the abstainers 
value the effect  f their abstention more than the effect of  their vote. And  this 
is another way o  saying that they do not value their vote on this issue as highly 
as the effects of  bstention. One cannot evade the conclusion, therefore, that the 
vote in itself is n  1  t of the highest  significance.  (Riker, 1959: 381) 
Second, when  in  groups  (such as the Americans for Democratic 
Action),  constitu  or party  leaders  maintain  an  attitude  such that STIMATING ROLL CALL SIGNIFICANCE  141 
ith me is against me,' " legislators "are  less likely 
, 1974: 79). Third, some interest groups and orga- 
ngressional Quarterly do regular polls of abstainers 
their unstated preferences. These polls are expected 
swered  by  members  of  congress.  They  are then 
he U.S. Congress, abstention is quite a poor way 
ecision.  Finally, abstention  is not popular  among 
n the basis of challengers' congressional compaigns. 
to be more unpopular when it occurs on significant 
even more likely to  be  an accurate measure of 
gnilicance model produces a "revealed  preference" 
ent of the significance of  each roll call is revealed 
gh their behavior. In economics and in other areas 
ars have shown that revealed preference measures 
to opinion polls, expert judgments, and any other 
to estimate expected inflation, economists prefer 
asury bills rather than  to  ask  experts for their 
reases (Fama and  Gibbons, 1984). In a similar 
oped here uses a realized or revealed preference 
f roll call significance. 
gislators  participating,  n,, is measured with all 200 
ed States Senate occurring during the first 6 months 
o compelling reason to select this period rather than 
s no reason to believe that the relationships reported 
rest of the series. I believe that the results 
her voting bodies around the world, but this verdict 
ication of  this model to these other legislatures. 
del, only the precise definition of  the procedural 
mber of roll calls for which a shock to significance 
need to be specified. 
les, XI,  are measured in  a variety of ways and 
ed as 1 if  roll call t occurred on Friday through 
through Thursday. To test the assumption of 
ntervals, and to control for unequal intervals 
s coded as the number of days between  the 
011  call at time t - 1.4 For testing purposes, 
feat), whether the president takes a position 
ea of the roll call, and measures of intraparty 
(1980: 24C) reported that 20 Republican Senators and three 
for a day or more in  1980 because they  were sick or 
families."  However, since most were only absent for 
to influence the results. 142  1  GARY  KING 
competition were also included. However, pre- 
that the only variable that appreciably influenced 
and the Congressional Record during these 6 
substantive considerations,  a plausible 
significant roll call, representatives 
floor for three to seven additional 
led  to  a value for q  of  four roll 
voting participation remains 
after being stimulated by a 
as a Box 
I  EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
estimates of  the version of  this  model chosen for 
Note first that  the  Q statistic (Ljung and  Box, 
residual from this estimation are not significantly 
as a set, as required for a good estimate of 
statistic is conceptually analogous, although 
to that in  ordinary  regression  analysis. It 
"explained"  37.8% of the variance. 
to roll call significance.' 
indicates that after taking 
holding a roll call 
six senators. 
lower than  .92). Th  1 chosen for presentation  (q  = 4 and X E Week,)  represents 
the others well, but  appears to most closely represent reality and to best estimate 
likely  to be  correlated  with  some of the procedural  variables 
1 calls would be less likely to be held on a Friday or Monday). 
d estimates (Achen, 1978; Goldberger,  1961). TABLE  1 
Parameter 
to be  Standard 
estimated  Variable  Estimate  error  Prob (estimate r  0) 
a  Constant  90.391  0.758 
@  Week,  - 6.070  1.212  <0.001 
91  S-l  - 0.580  0.070  <0.001 
92  s. - 2  - 0.408  0.079  <0.001 
93  S. - 3  - 0.260  0.079  0.001 
94  S, - 4  - 0.125  0.071  0.039 
= 4.376; proportionate reduction in error ("R2") 
18.600; Prob (the residuals are white noise I Q)  = 
ates on  the  previous  random  shocks  (the moving 
y plausibly  indicate  that  a change in  significance 
1 call would have about 58% reverberation  during 
during the next, 26% in  the next, and  13% in the 
errors are all very  small, indicating very precise 
arginal probabilities  (in the last  column) indicate 
sample of roll calls were taken, all of the parameters 
main different from zero and retain the same sign. 
coefficients, the estimate of  the significance of 
bers of the U.S. senate was generated. Although 
11s  in this paper is not feasible, Tables 2 and 3 
cance scores (j,),  Congressional Quarterly roll 
e), and substantive descriptions for the 10 most 
calls-as  determined by the legislators' actions 
d by  the  roll call  significance model,  and  as 
g the  most  highly  significant to the  senators 
ortant issues (Table 2). All were of relatively 
ors and high visibility to the public. In general, 
t important (Table 3) were considerably more 
the tables. TABLE 2 
The Ten Most Significant Senate Roll Calls 
(&I 
Si- 
CQ No.  score  Title and description 
S 2352  Council on Wage and Price Stability Extension. 
Reduce authorizations from $13.7 million in fiscal 1980 and $25 million in fiscal 1981 to $9.5 and $9.8 million, respectively. 
There was substantial debate and public attention. This was the first of  10 votes attempting to amend the bill. The final 
roll call was pro forma, since the real decision had  been made on this vote (p. 305). Adopted, n,  = 80, 6/2/80. 
H J Res 521 Draft Registration Funding. 
Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the joint resolution to transfer $13.3 million from the Airforce System 
in order to provide enough funds to register 19- and 20-year-old males, beginning in  1980 in case a military draft became 
necessary in the future. President Carter, changing his position in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, already 
had  the authority and needed only these funds for implementation. The plan  was very controversial:  "all  of Carter's 
opponents in the 1980 presidential election came out against the proposal."  Motion agreed to, n, = 94, 6/10/80. 
S 10 Rights of the Institutionalized. 
Amendment allowing Justice Department suits only when the Attorney General has substantial evidence that a person 
is being subjected to egregious or flagrant conditions. This was fourth of eight consecutive roll calls on the same topic, 
but all were on different points. The language in this amendment ("egregious  or flagrant conditions")  struck at the heart 
of this plan. Rejected,  n, = 90, 2/28/80  (see HR  10, below). 
H J Res 554  Fiscal 1980 Federal Trade Commission Appropriation. 
Motion to table (kill) the  Weiker, R-Conn., amendment to  bar federal assistance  for the Chrysler Corporation until 
Chrysler had  secured nonfederal assistance of  at least $1.43 billion.  First of  two consecutive  votes  on the  FTC; the 
second was not about Chrysler. Motion agreed to, n, = 93, 6/3/80. 
S Con Res 86 Fiscal 1981 Budget Targets. 
Motion to table  (kill) the  Cohen, R-Maine,  amendment to reduce  fiscal  1981 budget authority and outlays  of  water 
projects by $500 million. This was 7th of 41  votes on budget targets (with 2 intervening votes), but it was the only one 
on water projects.  Motion agreed to, n,  = 94, 5/7/80. H Con Res 272 Release of Soviet Dissident Andrei Sakharov. 
Adoption  of  concurrent  resolution to  express  (1) the  sense  of  congress that  Nobel  laureate Andrei  Sakharov, who 
condemned the  Soviet invasion of  Afghanistan, be  released from internal exile and (2) to support President  Carter's 
economic sanctions against the  Soviet Union  and  (3) refusal of  U.S.  participation in  the  1980 Summer Olympics in 
Moscow. Adopted, n,  = 91, 2/19/80. 
15  7.33  H Con Res 249 Moscow Olympics. 
Adoption of the resolution urging the Moscow Summer Olympic Games be moved, canceled, or boycotted, as a protest 
against the December 1979 invasion of  Afghanistan. Adopted. n. = 92.  1/29/84. 
53  7.18  HR 4612  Unemployment Compensation.  m 
Amendment to require, rather than permit, states to exclude an employee's contribution to his pension in deducting the  2 
amount of pension payments from unemployment benefits. First vote of only two on this topic. Congress eased a 1976  g 
law requiring states to reduce weekly unemployment compensation benefits to retirees by the amount received  from  2 
any private or public pension.  Rejected, n, = 92, 3/4/80.  2 
HR  10 Rights of  the Institutionalized.  Q 
m 
Adoption of the conference report on the bill to authorize the Justice Department to file lawsuits against states to protect  0 
the rights of those confined in  state institutions. The final action was by voice vote. With one intervening vote there  r  r 
were six votes on the same issue just  prior to this one. This is the second vote on the same issue in the top  10 (see  0 
CQ 47); the method "selected"  each of  the two votes from different series of votes on the issue.  Adopted, n,  = 93, 
5/6/80.  F 
P 
HR 5168 Military Personnel Management Extension. 
Motion to table (kill) the Warner, R-Va., amendment to the Armstrong amendment to increase  military pay by 3.4%.  8 
First of two on the same topic. The issue was  decided de facto here, since on the next vote (and a later voice vote)  5  z 
the bill passed as a formality. This was a key test of the Nunn-Warner  Military benefits package which contained seven  o 
major military programs. Motion rejected, n,  = 87, 2/4/80.  >  z 
0 
m  Note. Source: Table 1. Roll call descriptions were all paraphrased or quoted from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1980). Page references 
are given only when quoting from Congressional Quarterly news descriptions. TABLE 3 
The Ten Least Significant Senate Roll Calls 
- 
(t,) 
Significance 
CO No.  me  T-.. 
, . 
156  -  23.85  HR 7471 Debt Limit Extension. 
Passage of  the bill to extend the public debt limit at its existing level of $879 billion from May 30, 1980 through June 
5, 1980. This was a technical requirement to keep the government running while congressional leaders and the president 
mustered enough support to pass the annual extension. Passed, n,  = 57, 5/30/80. 
-  17.16  H J Res. 545 Fiscal 1980 Food Stamp Supplemental Appropriation. 
Adoption of the conference report on the joint  resolution to provide a supplemental appropriation  of a little less than  0 
asked for by  the Senate previously for  1980. It directs the Agriculture Department to proceed on the assumption that  * 
P 
total  spending for the year would  be  $9.191  billion  and to prohibit  more spending. The day before there had been a  4 
series of more controversial, high-visibility roll calls. "With  the way cleared for adoption of the emergency funding bill  E 
by  adoption of the authorization measure (S 13091, both chambers adopted the conference report"  (p. 415). Adopted,  Z 
0 
n, = 74, 5/15/80. 
-  11.95  H J Res 541  Emergency Fiscal  1980 Appropriations. 
Passage of  the joint  resolution to transfer $7.6 million to the Federal Trade Commission for May  1, 1980 to May 31, 
1980, from the State Department's contributions to international organizations. This was a temporary measure in order 
to keep the FTC's "doors  from closing."  The $7.6 million was later restored to the State Department (p.  147). Passed, 
n,  = 81, 5/1/80. 
-11.64  HR 3757 Channel Islands National Park. 
Passage of bill to establish 246,985-acre Channel Islands National Park on five islands off the southern California coast 
and to make technical changes to the National Parks and Recreation Act of  1978. Passed, n,  = 73, 2/18/80. 
-  10.12  S 1725 Low-Income Home Weatherization. 
Passage of bill  to authorize $2.2  billion  in  fiscal 1981-1983  to assist low-income persons to "weatherize"  their homes 
to conserve energy.  It was perceived as an energy issue rather than social welfare and was not  the focus of much 
attention. Later, "the  legislation got bogged  down in  a committee jurisdiction dispute in  the House and never cleared" 
(p. 462). Passed, n, = 80, 2/28/80. HR 7428 Oil Import Fee/Debt  Limit. 
Passage, over the president's  veto the day before, of  the existing debt limit of $879 billion and to disapprove the $4.62 
fee per barrel of imported oil that President Carter imposed effective March 15. Required and received two-thirds vote. 
This was a high-visibility vote which was never taken seriously by  most members of congress.  "From  the beginning 
the opposition movement attracted  members from opposite ends of  the political spectrum."  Although Carter, June 4, 
had appealed to legislators to "stand  up and take the political heat by making tough decisions,"  "earlier  votes left no 
doubt that the veto would be overridden"  (p. 273). This was probably important to Carter, but not to the Senate. Passed, 
n, = 78, 6/6/80. 
m 
V1 
Motion to table (kill) the Thurmond, R-SC,  amendment to cut  $800 million in  budget authority and $400 million in  4 
outlays from public service jobs in fiscal 1981 and add the funds to veterans' programs. Most changes here were technical  E 
and not controversial. Motion agreed to, n, = 83, 5/6/80. 
HR 3236 Disability Insurance.  2 
Amendment to allow payment of larger disability benefits to workers whose previous monthly incomes had  averaged  3 
between $600  and  $1000 than had  been allowed by  the Finance Committee bill.  "Through  the use of  a complicated  m 
formula, Javits' amendment would have brought the level of reductions in benefits to all other workers, with the exception  P  t- 
of the very poorest"  (pp. 436-7).  Seventh of  10  on the same bill.  One of the  10  was in the top 25%  of important roll  0 
calls. Amendment rejected,  n, = 85, 1/31/80. 
S 1309 Food Stamps.  F 
t- 
Motion to recommit the bill to conference with instructions to the Senate conferees that they insist on the deletion of 
House amendments establishing an income deduction for employment-related dependent-care expenses, expanding the  $ 
deduction for medical expenses,  and affecting the annual adjustment of  income deductions  and food stamp benefits.  3  z 
The vote following this one, which approved the conference report, was more important,  ranking  105 of the 200 roll  C] 
calls analyzed. Rejected, n, = 90, 5/14/80.  9  Z 
S 2337 Legal Services Corporation.  C) 
m 
Motion to table (kill) the Helms, R-NC, amendment to prohibit Legal Services Corporation lawyers from handling food 
stamp cases. This issue was somewhat political, but it was the proposal of a very conservative Senator, which commanded 
little attention and had little chance of succeeding. Following this and two unrelated roll calls, six other more important 
Legal Services Corporation votes occurred. Motion agreed to, n, = 86, 6/12/80. 
Note. Source: Table 1. Roll call descriptions were all paraphrased or quoted from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1980). Page references 
are given only when quoting from Congressional Quarterly news descriptions. 148  GARY KING 
e were characterized by very low visibility, con- 
ance. In the remainder of this section, I present four 
e  these assertions  and  a  somewhat  more  detailed 
consider the  amount of  discussion  and 
in the 1980 CQ Almanac; because of the 
it  is  often  difficult  to  separate  out  and 
ds and articles exactly apply to each roll 
ant roll calls,  it  is  clear  that  there was 
ven  than  for the  insignificant roll  calls. 
y the roll calls in the former group had 
r  sections; the  historical,  policy,  and 
scussed. For some in the latter category, 
r others, there was just a brief mention 
titute a useful indicator of 
st a minority of legislators. 
cloture votes (attempts 
ing four issues. None 
re in the top 10. The 
sues  and were close 
measure  of  the validity of  this  estimate  of  roll  call 
es (see Footnote  3). 
ly what the measure 
e results; however, 
hat we find. There 
he full model. A 
for the 10 most 
tables indicates 
to a filibuster, the 2 in the top 10 were on the general issues of rights 
data leads to markedly different results. This is to xample, 6 of the 10 roll calls in the least significant 
articipation levels higher than some roll calls in 
group (Table 2). It is therefore quite worthwhile to 
rt to purge participation of the procedural variables 
ocks to significance, as has been  done in  the 
by  the  model  as most  significant 
portant issue. A vote to extend the 
d Price Stability had a significance 
ly because of  the significance of 
participated than would have if 
is time of unusually high levels 
to congress, called the Council 
era1 senators "lashed  out at" 
ists, particularly the National 
Chamber of Commerce (CQ, 
points,  the funding of  Draft 
is session of  congress. This 
uster which lasted for 7 days. "[Public] consideration 
han five months"  (1980: 46). Another roll call was on 
s bill was "historic legislation 
ral government to file suit against state institutions 
hospitals and juvenile facilities"  (1980: 383). It was 
several  political  lines  (lib- 
ssion Appropriation @,  = 
kill the renewal of Chrysler 
ore visible, controversial, 
before). Another roll call 
concerned water projects. 
e vetoed 6 water projects." 
s in about 70% of congres- 
attention by Carter: "The 
bill. It's an inflationary 
s of  wanton waste of 
were not  at all con- 
only four dissenting 
erceived to be bold 150  1  GARY KING 
the notion that a wide margin does not necessarily 
there  were  many  consecutive roll calls, the 
o was usually given the highest  significance 
1 call selected on the issue of draft registration 
consecutive votes over 3  days.  Of  the 23 
final passage,  "most  [were] on procedural 
ply to consume time."  The "battle  actually 
the debate when the Senate June 10 agreed 
the  same issue  on  two  or more 
11  calls. In cases such as this, the 
from each  series as clearly the 
For example, during the 6 months analyzed, there were 
the Institutionalized, and only 
the debt limit. This was a very important issue, 
ant roll call. The more important measure, ex- 
ssed after the 6-month period 
roval of  an already  debated 
ext. There was a temporary 
gencies which was required 
stored). The establishment 
st of California and money 
ere two other examples of 
residential veto on an oil 
to President Carter, but 
was  very  quickly  and 
intended to estimate the 
t necessarily to anyone 
e bottom of the list are 
ing during the debate 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
was  to build on Riker's  (1959) model by 
model which  helped  in  estimating  the 
in a voting body  was  significant to its 
actions. The roll call significance model 
l2  For details on these and  the other significant roll calls, see Table 2. I  ROLL CALLS AND VOTING  151 
was chosen basec  on theoretical understandings and on previous empirical 
evidence. The yeasure is essentially legislative participation purged of 
the  effects of  procedural variables  and  of  the  bias that  occurs when 
unimportant roll calls follow important ones. This model was then estimated 
and presented in 'Table  1. Judging from the precise and plausible estimates 
of  the  parameter:^ and of  the interpretations of  St, the model appears to 
be a useful solution to the problem of  variations in  the significance of 
roll calls. 
Although  I have  concentrated primarily  on  U.S.  Congressional roll 
calls, this model, or a variation of  it, should be  as applicable in  any 
voting body. To check, one should fit this model or an appropriate version 
of it and interpret the parameters and S,. The resulting estimates should 
be used either as weights in a weighted least squares (or other) statistical 
analysis, or as an explicit exogenous variable by  itself or in interaction 
with other variables. This procedure could also be applied to mutually 
exclusive groups of  legislators (such as Democrats and Republicans or 
southern Democrats and northern Republicans) to tap the relative im- 
portance of  varicus issues to these different groups of  legislators. 
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